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MUNICIPAL BONDS IN THREE COUNTRIES: INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA 







When Alexander Hamilton was asked to take on the financial challenges of a young 
United States, he recognized the need for capital to invest in the country’s future. 
A recent book introduces Hamilton’s impact this way: 
 
During his relatively short life …, Hamilton…went on as the nation’s 
first Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to 1795 to engineer the U.S. 
financial revolution.  He did so to promote economic growth and 
national power.  He was ahead of his time.  Indeed, since we have only 
of late come to appreciate what he knew long ago about finance’s or 
credit’s connection to growth and power, he remained ahead of his time 
right down to the present.1 
 
New York’s capital markets, which Hamilton helped establish, can take credit for 
financing the bulk of local infrastructure in the U.S. over the past one hundred 
years.  In 1812, New York City issued the first general obligation (GO) municipal 
bond to finance the building of a canal.2 Outstanding debt of U.S. local 
governments had reached $200 million by 1860, and $516 million by 1870.3  
Today, the U.S. municipal bond market stands at about $3.8 trillion dollars.4 
 
 
* Director for Municipal Law and Finance at the Centre for Urban Law and Finance in Africa 
(CULFA) and Extraordinary Research Fellow of the Chair for Law, Justice and Sustainability of 
North-West University in Potchesfstroom, South Africa. 
1 R. Sylla and D. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton on Finance, Credit and Debt, Columbia University 
Press (2018), page 1 
2 Malanga, Steven. "The Muni-Bond Debt Bomb... and how to dismantle it." City Journal 20.3 
(2010). 
3 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory 
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961), page 16. 
4 Investor Bulletin: The Municipal Securities Market https://www.investor.gov/additional-
resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-municipal-securities-market, retrieved 8 
December 2019 
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Largely because of the enduring success of the U.S. municipal bond model, 
attempts have been made over the past two decades to establish municipal bond 
markets in developing countries. This article traces developments in South Africa 
and India.  Comparing the situation in these two countries with one another, and 
with the long-established municipal bond market in the United States, we explore 
how context affects outcomes. In development circles, it is widely accepted that 
municipal bonds and other credit arrangements can help finance essential local 
infrastructure.   
 
I hope to demonstrate that the political, institutional and regulatory environment 
that empowers or constrains the use of municipal bonds and other borrowing tools 
is complex, and that municipal bonds are not magic.  For municipal bonds per se to 
be a sustainable infrastructure financing mechanism, local government must be 
creditworthy and there must be a helpful institutional, legal and regulatory 
framework.5 Citizens must want and expect their local government to provide 
services and infrastructure, and they must expect to pay for it.  Local government 





Significant contrasts. These three countries differ in size, wealth, and 
governmental structure. India has by far the largest population, with over 1.3 billion 
people.  This is four times the population of the United States, and more than 20 
times the population of South Africa. The United States is a high-income country, 
with a per capita GDP of US $62,641; South Africa is a middle-income country, 
with a per capita GDP of US $6,374; and India is a lower middle-income country, 
with a per capita GDP of $2,016.6  India and the U.S. are federal countries, in which 
the powers of local government units depend entirely on state laws. By contrast, 
South Africa is a unitary country, with significant decentralization in the local 
sphere.  These differences have consequences for the state of the municipal bond 
market in each country, and for the market’s future development. 
 
Indian urban local bodies (ULBs) have limited powers and functions. In 1992, 
the 74th Amendment to the Indian Constitution recognized, and attempted to 
empower, urban local government, noting that “in many States local bodies have 
 
5 Local governments which are not creditworthy can borrow with a government guarantee, but 
such borrowing should be thought of as state or national borrowing, since that is where the risk 
actually lies. 
6 World Bank estimates for 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
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become weak and ineffective…[and] are not able to perform effectively as vibrant 
democratic units of self-government.”7  However, the 74th Amendment left it to 
each state to enact enabling legislation and to provide ULB finances. Within India’s 
federal structure, it is up to the states to determine the powers, functions, and 
revenues of ULBs.  Most Indian states have failed to devolve significant authority 
and revenues to these bodies.  The lack of a stable and reliable financial base has 
naturally constrained borrowing by ULBs, despite episodic enthusiasm for 
municipal bonds. India is comprised of 29 States and seven Union Territories.  The 
States have considerable autonomy, while the Union Territories are governed 
centrally.8 Many Indian states are larger than countries in other parts of the world, 
so the concept of meaningful decentralization of functions and finances has merit, 
but it remains far from realization. Most infrastructure is installed through state-
controlled channels, and most subnational borrowing is state-level borrowing. 
 
South African municipalities have considerable responsibility and autonomy.  
South Africa is small, compared to India and the U.S.  Its 257 municipalities have 
extensive, constitutionally specified powers and functions, are responsible for local 
land use regulation, and are largely responsible for planning, constructing, 
operating, and maintaining local infrastructure. Municipal powers do not depend 
on provincial legislation or fiscal transfers. South Africa’s largest cities have strong 
economies and own-source revenue bases.  Poorer, rural municipalities rely more 
on transfers from national government.  Municipalities’ legally authorized revenue 
instruments (primarily property taxes and tariffs on water and electricity), together 
with equalizing transfers from national government, are broadly adequate to the 
functional responsibilities of municipalities, and in principle provide a solid 
foundation to borrow for infrastructure investment.  However, there are now 
significant financial problems in many municipalities.  These are mostly 
attributable to poor financial management, rather than the underlying fiscal 
framework. 
 
U.S. local government is meaningfully decentralized.  Like India, the U.S. is a 
federal country, and state legislation determines the powers, functions, and finances 
of local government units. Despite this nominal similarity, U.S. municipalities are 
generally autonomous to an extent that is distinctly unlike India, and without many 
 
7 Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Constitution Seventy-fourth Amendment Act, 
1992 
8 Delhi is something of an exception.  In Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi vs. 
Union of India, CA No. 2357 of 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the National Capital 
Territory’s government has substantial legislative and executive powers, and is not subject to the 
control of the center in most matters. 
98
Glasser: Municipal Bonds in Three Countries
Published by Reading Room, 2020
parallels in the world.  There are over 90,000 local governments in the U.S.,9 
including a proliferation of cities, counties, school districts, water districts, fire 
districts, and other special districts and institutions, most of which have locally 
elected councils or boards, significant locally determined revenues and 
expenditures, and the ability to borrow for capital investment. Debt securities issued 
by any of these local entities are thought of as “municipal bonds,” even when the 
issuer is not a municipality per se.  Most infrastructure and service delivery in the 
U.S. is organized and financed at the local level. 
 
MUNICIPAL BOND ISSUERS 
 
Each country’s laws and regulations impact on municipal borrowers and bond 
issuers.  Analytically, it is useful to start with the functions that local government 
in each country is legally authorised or mandated to perform, the infrastructure 
investments for which it is responsible, its authority to borrow, the revenues legally 
available to repay its debt, and its authority to pledge revenues and assets to secure 
debt. Laws and regulations relating to financial management, accounting, and 
reporting help support transparency and an informed, efficient marketplace.  In 
addition to these issues, which directly affect municipal borrowers and bond 
issuers, we should consider legislation related to capital markets, taxation, and 
remedies available to creditors. This article attempts to survey and identify these 
issues for comparative purposes, but is not intended as an in-depth treatise on 
municipal bonds in any of the three countries. 
 
Local governments differ in their functions, and thus their need for debt 
finance. The functions that a local government unit performs, and the infrastructure 
it is consequently expected to finance, fundamentally influence its need to borrow 
for investment.  There are 29 states in India, and 50 in the United States.  These 
states in both countries are diverse, with a wide variety of economies, politics, and 
histories. Local government powers and functions vary from state to state in these 
two countries, and sometimes within a state. Although India and the U.S. are both 
federal countries, the powers and functions of U.S. cities are generally far greater 
than those of Indian cities, and typically include responsibility for building, 
operating, and maintaining most public infrastructure in urban areas. In both India 
and the U.S., it is not unusual to see parallel authorities, districts, and entities that 
are charged with building some types of urban infrastructure, and these entities do 
borrow to finance such investments.  In India, these are usually controlled by the 
 
9 US Census Bureau, 2017 Government Units Survey (accessed 7 December 2019 at 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gus.html). 
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state, whereas in the U.S., these are usually separate and autonomous entities.10 By 
contrast with India and the U.S., South Africa has one set of national laws that apply 
to all municipalities, and municipalities largely have the same functions throughout 
the country, with the qualification that outside of the eight large metropolitan 
municipalities, local government functions are divided between two levels: 
relatively compact local municipalities and larger district municipalities (each of 
which includes several local municipalities). Unlike the other two countries, South 
Africa does not have parallel authorities responsible for infrastructure investment, 
though some functions can be organized as municipally owned enterprises.  
 
Local governments differ in their ability to service debt.  Financial 
sustainability, including debt carrying capacity, depends on the revenues available 
to meet local government’s responsibilities.  Three kinds of revenue can play a role: 
local taxes, local fees and charges, and intergovernmental transfers or revenue-
sharing.  If these three legs are adequate and stable, the financial sustainability of 
local government further depends on revenue management and expenditure control.  
Municipal bonds are generally neither possible nor desirable in the absence of 
stable and predictable local budgets, annual operating surpluses, and clear 
prioritization of infrastructure needs.   
 
Own-source revenue instruments are especially important.  Although 
borrowing against future intergovernmental transfers and revenue sharing is 
possible, own-source revenues collected by local government from residents and 
businesses seem to be the real key to servicing debt obligations sustainably.  The 
authorized own source revenue instruments (taxes, fees, and charges) vary from 
state to state in the federal structures of India and the U.S., whereas own source 
revenue instruments are the same for all South African municipalities.  
 
In all three countries, property taxes are a main driver of local government 
debt-carrying capacity.  Property taxes are an unconditional revenue source, which 
can be used for any legitimate local government purpose.  They are therefore 
especially important in considering local government’s ability to sustain itself and 
successfully issue municipal bonds. Property taxes account for 72 percent of 
 
10 In the US, such entities’ functions usually extend beyond the boundaries of a single 
municipality, and may include several municipalities, as well as unincorporated areas.  Examples 
include transport and water authorities, and school and fire protection districts.  Examples in India 
include development authorities that are often focused on a single city, and water or transport 
authorities that may serve several ULBs as well as rural areas. 
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local government tax collections in the U.S.,11 60 percent in India,12 and virtually 
all local taxes in South Africa.13  In the U.S., local government in most states is 
authorized to impose sales and use taxes, and in some states municipalities are 
authorized to impose local income taxes.14  In India, some ULBs impose utility 
taxes, property transfer taxes, and development charges, but these generate little 
revenue per capita compared to South Africa and the U.S.  Prior to the 2017 
adoption of the Goods and Services Tax, Indian ULBs imposed a range of luxury 
taxes, octroi and other entry taxes, advertising taxes, and various surcharges and 
cesses, but national Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation15 has recently 
abolished these taxes, with dramatic impact on the budgets of some ULBs.16   
 
User charges can support bonds to finance infrastructure.17 In general, user 
charges for services such as water and sanitation services and electricity are more 
than enough to cover operating costs in the U.S., but they rarely cover even 
operating costs in India or South Africa.  The corollary is that in the U.S., 
municipalities and other local service entities rely on user charge revenues to 
support municipal bonds issued to finance utility infrastructure, and can finance 
investments using revenue bonds, with debt service paid entirely from user charges 
 
11 2016 data from US Census Bureau, retrieved 2 January 2020 at 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances/tables/2016/summary-
tables/16slsstab1a.xlsx 
12 2017-18 data from Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, State of 
Municipal Finances in India, Study Prepared for the Fifteenth Finance Commission, 2019, 
retrieved 2 January 2020 at 
https://fincomindia.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/fincom15/StudyReports/State%20of%20M
unicipal%20Finances%20in%20India.pdf 
13 While property tax is the only municipal tax in South Africa, it makes up less than 25% of 
municipalities’ own-source revenues, which include charges for water, electricity and other 
services.  See StatsSA, “Quarterly financial statistics of municipalities,” June 2019, retrieved 2 
January 2020 at http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P9110&SCH=7625 
14 A helpful chart showing which states allow which local taxes is contained in Figure 2 of 
Reschovsky, Andrew. "The Tax Autonomy of Local Governments in the United States." (2019). 
15 Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, 
Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; and Goods and Services Tax (Compensation 
to States) Act, 2017. 
16 A case study describing the impact of this legislation in Mumbai provides some useful insights: 
Mankikar, S, “The Impact of GST on Municipal Finances in India: A Case Study of Mumbai,” 
Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief, September 2018, Issue No. 257 
17 See Ebel, R.D. & Wang, Y. 2018, User Charges to Fund State and Local Infrastructure Services, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, St. Louis. 
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and connection charges.  In South Africa and India, such revenue surpluses are rare, 
and this is a major barrier to a sustainable market for municipal bonds. 
 
Formula based, unconditional fiscal transfers can also support bonds.  In 
places where the economic base for local taxes, fees and charges is insufficient for 
the minimum functions local government must perform, local bodies must rely on 
intergovernmental transfers.  For infrastructure funding, such transfers often take 
the form of conditional grants, with transfers dedicated to support specific projects 
or programmes.18  The strengths and weaknesses of such conditional transfers are 
beyond the scope of this article. However, if transfers are predictable, formula-
based and unconditional, and there is a reasonable expectation that they will 
continue for the indefinite future, local government can leverage intergovernmental 
transfer flows by pledging them to service debt, as with any other future revenues. 
 
Indian ULBs depend on transfers from national and state governments.  
India’s intergovernmental fiscal architecture relies on Central and State Finance 
Commissions to meet every five years and make recommendations for transfers to 
local government units.  The Central Finance Commission recommendations are 
usually accepted by the Union government. For the period 2015-2020, Central 
Finance Commission allocation to ULBs amounted to just over $7 per capita, per 
year.19 While states have had a generally poor record of compliance with the five-
year requirement for State Finance Commissions,20 the eventual amounts 
recommended by State Finance Commissions – an average of $16 per capita per 
year over the last four years – are more than the transfers allocated by the Central 
Finance Commission.21 Both Central and State Finance Commission allocations to 
local government units have been rising over time.  These transfers are substantial, 
and if the Finance Commissions were to structure these transfers in a more 
permanent, predictable, and unconditional way, ULBs could usefully leverage them 
 
18 India’s urban schemes are an example: there have been a series of central government schemes 
to support investment in cities. JNNURM, in 2005, was in principle aimed at promoting 
financially sustainable and accountable ULBs and parastatals. A core idea was to offer funds for 
capital investment in exchange for specified reforms.  This approach was largely continued with 
the 2015 AMRUT and Smart Cities Schemes.  Although there are some incentives for municipal 
bonds provided in the AMRUT schemes, the conditionality of these funds renders them unsuitable 
to support long term borrowing. 
19 Author’s calculation based on a total grant of Rs 87,143.80 crore, then equivalent to about $14 
billion, spread over five years. 
20 Manish Gupta and Pinaki Chakraborty, State Finance Commissions: How effective have they 
been in empowering local governments? NIPFP Work Paper No. 263, April 30, 2019 
21 Ibid, Table 3, author’s currency conversion 
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through municipal bond issues or other borrowing, to accelerate urban 
infrastructure investment. 
 
South African local government receives transfers of two kinds.  First, South 
Africa municipalities benefit from a constitutionally mandated “equitable share” of 
national revenues.  The equitable share formula is complex, but mostly driven by 
population and poverty.  Poorer, more rural municipalities, which have less own-
source revenue potential, receive more equitable share funding per capita than 
more urban municipalities.  The equitable share transfers are unconditional and can 
be used for any legitimate local government purpose.  Second, municipalities 
receive conditional grants of many kinds, which have proliferated and grown 
substantially over the last fifteen years, and are dedicated to specific uses. South 
Africa has permitted municipalities to pledge equitable share transfers to secure 
borrowing since 2003,22 and government has recently announced that it will remove 
language requiring the approval of the National Treasury for a pledge of conditional 
transfers.  The previous restriction on pledging of conditional transfers is being 
removed specifically so that municipalities can leverage these revenue flows, 
subject to the conditions of the grants.23  Until recently, there had been limited 
pledging of conditional transfers, but only for the three years of government’s 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. 
 
In the U.S., state transfers to municipalities are significant, but not 
predictable. While states’ transfers to local governments have gone up and down 
over the last decade, over the longer term there has been an increasing trend.  36% 
of local government revenues come from intergovernmental transfers, the 
overwhelming majority of which are transfers from the states to local government.24  
Unpredictable transfers are not suitable for long term leveraging, though some 




22 Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003, Section 48(2)(e) 
23 Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing, 2017 Update, retrieved 25 January 2020 at 
https://csp.treasury.gov.za/Resource%20_Centre/Conferences/Documents/DFI%20Day/Municipal
%20Borrowing%20Policy%20Framework%20update%2030%20Dec%202017%20(Draft).pdf 
24 In 2016, 36 percent of US local government’s general revenue came from intergovernmental 
transfers; 88 percent of transfers came from state governments (including indirect federal funds) 
and 12 percent came directly from the federal government. Urban Institute, State and Local Tax 








India has over 4,000 ULBs that might theoretically issue bonds, as well as a 
large number of state-created development authorities, water and sewerage boards, 
and other entities responsible for investment in urban infrastructure. The borrowing 
powers of ULBs and other entities depend entirely on state legislation.  State laws 
typically include rules as to what entities may borrow, how much, for what purpose, 
for what term, and subject to what processes and approvals.  A 2011 World Bank 
study undertook a detailed review of the laws in four states, and concluded that in 
these states, ULB borrowing requires the approval of the state government, usually 
on a case-by-case basis, and this can often take six months or more.  The research 
showed that “in all cases where some sort of substantive, merit-based scrutiny of 
the proposed loan transaction is conducted, there are no clear criteria governing the 
assessment (or at least none which are clearly documented and understood by the 
applicant ULB or investors). The process through which the assessment is 
conducted is highly opaque, and there is no mandated timing.”25  After state 
approval, ULB councils must approve the borrowing through a resolution passed at 
a special meeting convened specifically for the purpose of approving the proposed 
borrowing.26  In 2017, the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, in 
their Annual Survey of India's City-Systems (ASICS)27 found that only 4 out of 23 
ULBs surveyed are authorized to borrow money without state or central 
government approval. 
 
The power to issue bonds is meaningless without stable, predictable and 
adequate revenues that can be used for repayment.  In 1993, the 74th Amendment 
to the Indian Constitution recognised ULBs as a third tier of government, and 
provided that a state legislature may devolve to ULBs the responsibility for 
specified matters, but it left actual devolution of these matters to the states.28  
Moreover, ULBs’ power to levy taxes and fees also requires specific state 
 
25 World Bank, Developing a Regulatory Framework for Municipal Borrowing in India, Vol. 1, 
2011, page 28; retrieved 12 January 2020 at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/132101468281673152/-Main-report 
26  World Bank, Developing a Regulatory Framework for Municipal Borrowing in India, Vol. 1, 
2011, page 107; retrieved 12 January 2020 at http://docments.worldbank.org/curated/en/-
506141468042303569/Annexure-one-to-seven 
27 Available at http://www.janaagraha.org/asics/ASICS-2017.html 
28 Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, section 243W 
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legislation.29  Local autonomy to formulate tax policy is severely limited,30 and 
there are many rebates and exemptions, including a Constitutional prohibition on 
taxing property of the Union Government.31  As a result, property tax collections in 
India, amounting to 0.14%  of GDP, are significantly lower than in other developing 
countries, let alone OECD countries.32 
  
Most states have failed to provide ULBs with stable, predictable and adequate 
revenues.  Such revenues could be provided either by authorizing ULBs to use 
robust own-source revenue instruments or by providing predictable, unconditional 
transfers or revenue sharing from state revenues.  The finances of ULBs are 
generally anemic by global standards, and this is one bottleneck that has constrained 
the development of the municipal bond market. After the 74th Amendment was 
adopted, there were still various state and local taxes (e.g. VAT, luxury taxes, octroi 
and other entry taxes, advertising taxes, and various surcharges and cesses) that 
raised revenue for ULBs. Since then, many of these have been eliminated, and from 
2017 ULB finances faced a new challenge when Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
legislation abolished these local taxes.  A case study describing the impact of this 
legislation in Mumbai provides some useful insights.33  
 
State guarantees of municipal bonds in India are common, but not the rule.  
The 1998 bond issue by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was noteworthy 
because it was the first ULB to issue a bond without a state guarantee.  In 1997 
there had been a municipal bond issue by the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, 
but it was backed by a guarantee from the state of Karnataka.34  Subsequent 
guaranteed municipal bond issues include a 2000 private placement bond issued by 
the Indore Municipal Corporation in Madhya Pradesh, a 2003 issue by the Chennai 
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board in Tamil Nadu, a 2005 issue by 
the Chennai Municipal Corporation, a 2005 issue by the Karnataka Water and 
Sanitation Pooled Fund, and a 2018 issue by the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region 
 
29 Id., section 243X; see also P. K. Mohanty, “Give cities a share of GST to make them viable,” 
http://www.civilsocietyonline.com/cities/give-cities-a-share-of-gst-to-make-them-viable/ 
30 Om Prakash Mathur, Property Tax and Municipal Finance in India, 2020  
31 Art. 285, Constitution of India 
32 Om Prakash Mathur, supra, at pp. 10-11 
33 Mankikar, S, “The Impact of GST on Municipal Finances in India: A Case Study of Mumbai,” 
ORF Issue Brief, September 2018, Issue No. 257 
34 Urbanisation in India: Challenges, Opportunities and the Way Forward, edited by Isher Judge 
Ahluwalia, Ravi Kanbur, P. K. Mohanty 
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Development Authority.35  The state guarantee seems to be more common for non-
ULB “municipal bonds,” which is logical, since these bonds are, in any event, 
issued by state entities. 
 
ULBs can pledge collateral to lenders, but this may be of dubious value.   State 
laws generally authorize ULBs to pledge immovable property owned by the ULB 
and revenue from taxes, fees, and levies imposed by the ULB.36  However, it is not 
clear how investors would enforce such pledges.  Only some states provide for 
attachment of ULB funds in the event of a default, and this can only be done through 
application to the state government (rather than e.g. through a court process).  There 
are no state laws authorizing the attachment of ULB property in order to enforce 
lenders’ rights.37  It is not completely clear that the default provisions apply to bond-
holders (as opposed to lenders), but even assuming that they do, there are practical 
problems of enforcement: no individual bondholder is likely to have enough of a 
stake to warrant the time and expense required to initiate an attachment process.  If 
one bond-holder does so, it is not clear what the consequences would be for other 
bond-holders.  Some states have authorized ULBs to create special purpose escrow 
accounts that divert specific revenues for the benefit of creditors,38 and these 
arrangements appear to provide more security to bondholders, and to allow for less 
political interference in the enforcement of legal rights. 
 
2. South Africa 
 
South Africa has 257 municipalities, of which 53 are potential bond issuers.  
The term “municipality” can be misleading to those unfamiliar with the country, 
because it does not signify an urban area.  South African municipalities are “wall-
to-wall,” i.e. they cover the entire country, and include both urban and rural areas 
in varying proportions.39  There is a great deal of economic inequality between 
municipalities, and many municipalities in rural areas do not have a substantial 
own-source revenue base.  Although there is no legal barrier to bond issuance by 
the poorest municipalities, the most optimistic count of potential municipal bond 
issuers would include the eight Category A metropolitan municipalities, the 19 
 
35 This information was compiled by Mathangi Chandrasekhar, of the Janaagraha Centre for 
Citizenship and Democracy. 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid, page 108 
39 Unlike India’s states, South Africa’s provinces have little authority over municipalities, and 
provincial infrastructure responsibilities are largely in the health and education sectors. 
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Category B1 municipalities (which house secondary cities), and the 26 Category 
B2 municipalities (which contain large towns).  Of these 53 potential bond issuers, 
only four have actually issued municipal bonds since the democratic era that began 
in 1994.40 
 
Municipal borrowing powers are governed by national legislation,41 and are not 
subject to any regulatory or approval processes at the provincial level. Key 
provisions of South African legislation include 1) authority for an elected council 
to bind the municipality (and future councils) to repay debt;42 2) limitations as to 
the purpose of long-term borrowing – municipalities may incur-long term debt only 
for “capital expenditure on property, plant or equipment to be used for the purpose 
of achieving the objects of local government,” and in certain circumstances for re-
financing existing long-term debt;43  3) procedures to ensure the council has 
considered the implications of borrowing, informed the public in advance, provided 
an opportunity for comment, 44 and disclosed all information that may be material 
to a prospective lender or investor;45 and 4) limitations as to the currency which 
may be borrowed (municipal debts must be denominated in South African Rands 
and not indexed to any foreign currency).46  Procedurally, a municipal bond issue 
in South Africa is authorized by resolution of the municipal council, signed by the 
mayor.47 The debt agreement itself must the signed by the accounting officer of the 
municipality.48  
 
There are no state or national guarantees for municipal bonds in South Africa.  
Bond buyers must base their investment decisions on their own judgments about 
the creditworthiness of South African municipalities, and understand that there are 
no provincial or national guarantees.  Bond investors and other lenders are therefore 
not willing to extend credit to municipalities that are unlikely to be able to repay 
 
40 A fifth metropolitan municipality, eThekwini, has indicated that it will soon issue its first 
municipal bond. 
41 Chapter 6 of the Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003 
42 Section 230A, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended by the Sixth 
Amendment Act of 2001 
43 Section 46, Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003 (MFMA) 
44 Section 46 (3), MFMA 
45 Section 49, MFMA 
46 Section 47(a), MFMA 
47 Section 46(2)(a), MFMA 
48 Section 46(2)(b), MFMA 
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their debt obligations.  It is clear to all that credit extended to municipalities “will 
not be guaranteed by the central fiscus.”49 There are no binding restrictions on the 
amount of debt that a municipality can incur, though the South African National 
Treasury has issued guidelines suggesting that a municipality’s outstanding debt 
should not exceed 45% of operating revenues, and that debt service should be 
between 6% and 8% of operating expenditure.50  This reliance on investors’ due 
diligence in the municipal sector has prevented the cycle of spiraling, unsustainable 
debt and bailouts that has affected many of South Africa’s SOEs, which did receive 
national government guarantees for their borrowings. 
 
Municipalities can provide bondholders with a wide range of security 
interests.  Municipalities are authorized to give liens, pledges, mortgages, cessions, 
and to otherwise hypothecate an asset or to give other forms of collateral; to deposit 
funds as security; to dedicate specific revenue streams to payment of debts; to retain 
various revenue streams at specified levels; and more.51  The key constraint is that 
if a municipal council agrees to any of these security arrangements, it must either 
determine that the asset or right being pledged is not necessary for providing a 
minimum level of basic municipal services; or if it is necessary, the council must 
indicate the manner in which the availability of the asset or right will be protected.52 
 
3. United States 
 
There are more than 90,000 local government units in the U.S.53  Not all of 
these issue bonds, but most do.  According to an industry advocacy group, there are 
nearly 50,000 municipal bond issuers in the United States. This includes states and 
general purpose local governments such as cities, towns and counties, as well as a 
wide variety of special districts and authorities, such as school districts, water and 
sanitation districts, and other special purpose entities.54  The overwhelming 
majority of these local government units are creditworthy, and the main reason that 
the remaining 40,000 have not issued municipal bonds is that they have relatively 
 
49 Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing and Financial Emergencies, adopted by Cabinet 
December 2000, retrieved 11 January 2020 at https://www.gov.za/documents/municipal-
borrowing-and-financial-emergencies-policy-framework 
50 Uniform Financial Ratios and Norms January 2014, National Treasury MFMA Circular No. 71  
51 Subsection 2 of Section 48, MFMA 
52 Subsection 2 of Section 48, MFMA 
53 https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
54 Municipal Bonds for America, https://munibondsforamerica.org/resources/ 
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small operating budgets and investment needs, compared to the relatively high 
fixed costs of bond issuance.   
 
Some municipal borrowing requires voter approval.  Many states require voter 
approval for any general obligation (GO) borrowing.  Some states allow lower 
levels of borrowing on council’s authorization alone, but require voter approval for 
higher levels of borrowing.  As one example, Washington State allows municipal 
councils to authorize general obligation debt up to 1.5% of the assessed valuation 
of properties in the municipality, requires voter approval of additional debt up to a 
total of 5% of assessed valuation, and allows an additional 5% over that cap in the 
case of debt approved by voters and to be used specifically for water, lights, and 
sewers when those facilities are owned and controlled by the municipality.55  
Issuance of a municipal bond, subject to voter approval if required, is authorized 
by resolution or ordinance of the municipal council or other governing body.  The 
specific requirements depend on state legislation, and sometimes on the provisions 
of a home-rule charter.  The resolution or ordinance specifies the purpose of the 
bond issue, the number, denomination, and term of the bonds to be issued, when 
payments of principal and interest will be made, and the security arrangements, 
pledges, and covenants that are undertaken for the benefit of bondholders.  
 
Voter approval may be required for GO bonds, but not for revenue bonds.  In 
the case of GO bonds, the full faith and credit of the municipality is obligated, i.e. 
the municipality is obligated to pay bondholders from whatever taxes are necessary, 
and whatever other funds it can access, including those would require increasing 
the rate of property tax.  In the case of revenue bonds, bondholders can look only 
to specified revenue streams, e.g. water service charges, road and bridge tolls, etc. 
for repayment.  In general, the authority of municipalities to issue GO bonds is 
more limited than for revenue bonds, since citizens are felt to need protection from 
the risk of increased property taxes. 
 
“Iowa in 1857 and Illinois in 1870 had adopted constitutions which 
set limits on local government debt in terms of a percentage of 
assessed value. Widespread adoption of this and other types of 
constitutional restrictions on the borrowing powers of local 
governments came as an aftermath of the crisis of the 1870's. Within 
a very few years, some such provisions were placed in the 
constitutions of a majority of the States. Nearly as promptly also, 
 
55 Wash. Const., Art. 8 §6  
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various devices and legal doctrines were developed to limit or 
circumvent effects of such provisions.”56  
 
The use of proceeds may be restricted to purely public purposes.  Because 
American cities are “creatures of the state”57 we look to state laws to understand 
municipal borrowing powers, restrictions, and procedural requirements.  Some 
rules are found in state constitutions, others in ordinary legislation, and still others 
in city charters.58  Some restrictions came into being in the 19th century, following 
several municipal financial crises connected with railroad investments and loans.  
Hoping to ensure that their citizens were well-connected to the developing national 
rail network, counties and municipalities incurred debt to support railroad 
construction, but many companies went bankrupt, and lines were abandoned.  This 
left some local governments in a precarious financial position, and resulted in a 
wave of restrictions on municipal investment in support of private enterprise.59  A 
typical example provides that: 
 
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township or school 
district shall lend or pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or 
indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of, any person, company or 
corporation, public or private, for any amount, or for any purpose 
whatever; or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability 
of any person, company or corporation, public or private, in or out 
of the state.60 
 
North Carolina is the only U.S. state requiring prior approval of municipal 
borrowing.  Municipalities in North Carolina are required to apply to the State’s 
Local Government Commission before they issue debt. The Commission “works 
with local governments to determine the necessity of a project, the size of the issue, 
and the most expedient form of financing, then guides all projects through a 
rigorous review to ensure the financing meets all statutory requirements. The Debt 
Management Section oversees the sale and issuance of all local government debt, 
 
56 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory 
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961), page 21 
57 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1980) 
58 See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutional and Statutory 
Restrictions on Local Government Debt (1961) 
59 Pinsky, David E. "State constitutional limitations on public industrial financing: an historical 
and economic approach." U. Pa. L. Rev. 111 (1962): 265 
60 Colorado Constitution Art. 11, §1 
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then monitors repayment of debt and issues debt notices required under statute.” 61  
The Commission was originally established during the Great Depression to help 
local governments in North Carolina work out of their debt difficulties.  Thereafter, 
it has remained in place to control and facilitate local debt operations. 
 
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKETS 
 
The municipal bond market is a segment within national financial markets.  
Financial markets in any country include debt instruments (bonds) and equities 
(company shares). When local government issues a municipal bond, it is offering a 
debt security that competes for investors’ capital with other debt securities. In each 
of these countries, the dominant bond issuer is the national government, and these 
sovereign bonds are seen by investors as the least risky investment. Corporate and 
municipal bonds are therefore typically priced in reference to, i.e. at a “spread” 
over, a benchmark sovereign bond.   
 
Creditworthiness is subjective.  The spread over sovereign debt that a municipal 
bond issuer must offer depends on buyers’ perceptions of the issuer’s 
creditworthiness relative to that of the national government.  Creditworthiness has 
both qualitative and quantitative elements, and the judgment that ultimately matters 
is that of bond buyers.62  Municipal bond credit ratings are assigned by ratings 
agencies, whose business it is to evaluate credit risk, i.e. they undertake research 
and offer their opinions about the likelihood that a bond issuer will pay its credit 
obligations as and when due.  These credit ratings can be helpful to bond buyers, 
especially in a market with many investment vehicles and many investors, such as 
the U.S. market.  In all three countries, institutional fund managers are generally 
required to invest in instruments with a minimum credit rating.  However, many 
institutional investors view a credit rating as only a starting point, and do at least 
some research and evaluation of their own.  Note that rating agencies have no direct 
risk exposure if a municipality defaults, and global experience shows that rating 




commission, retrieved January 25 2020 
62 If bond insurance or third-party guarantees are involved, then another relevant judgement is that 
of the insurer or other entity bearing the risk of municipal default. 
63 Bussiere, M and Ristiniemi, A, Credit Ratings and Debt Crises (September 1, 2012). Banque de 
France Working Paper No. 396, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144235or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144235 
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Investors and rating agencies emphasize various factors in arriving at 
assessments of creditworthiness and the ratings they assign.  There is no single, 
standard rating methodology.  Ultimately, bond buyers want to be paid, and so they 
are interested in issuers that have been evaluated as managing their operations and 
finances well, that report their financial positions accurately, and that have stable 
operating surpluses, i.e. revenues that are consistently more than operational 
spending requirements. Although investors and rating agencies do use various 
financial ratios in forming judgements about creditworthiness, the probability of a 
default cannot be calculated with mathematical precision, as many factors come 
into play.64  In South Africa and the U.S., audited municipal financial statements 
are reliable and readily available.  Municipal finance data in India is still much 
harder to come by, although some states have made progress in standardizing 
municipal accounting and financial reporting. 
 
Local government borrowing in the form of loans is most common in India 
and South Africa. Municipal bonds are the focus of this article, but the dominance 
of direct lending in India and South Africa should be mentioned, and has several 
implications: first, it is financial institutions, rather than individuals, that are the 
primary investors in municipal debt in these countries.  Second, loans are usually 
held to maturity by the institution that makes the loan.  Third, loans are usually 
repaid in a series of payments over time, each of which includes interest on the 
unpaid principal balance, plus a portion of the principal, whereas bonds usually 
feature a semi-annual payment of interest, with the entire principal due at 
maturity.65  Finally, the predominance of loans, and the small stock of municipal 
bonds means that there is not a significant secondary market in either India or South 
Africa. Municipal bonds rarely trade, even though they are designed to be tradeable.  
Most municipal bonds end up being treated much like loans, in that they are initially 
bought by banks and other financial institutions, which mostly hold the bonds to 
maturity. There seem to be few individual holders of municipal bonds in India and 
South Africa.   
 
Bonds are the dominant form of municipal borrowing in the U.S. Because 
municipal bonds are issued in relatively small denominations ($5,000 is typical in 
the United States), they are able to attract the savings of small investors.  The 
 
64 For one example of how issuers are rated, see Moody’s Investor Service, Rating Methodology, 
Regional and Local Governments, at 
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_1072625, retrieved 
Dec. 8 2019. 
65 In fact, either type of instrument can be structured with a variety of different payment schedules, 
but these traditional structures dominate the market. 
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primary market for municipal bonds is one of the largest financial markets in the 
U.S.66  Nearly half of all municipal bonds are held by individual investors, and 
another quarter of the stock is held by mutual funds, with the remainder mostly 
divided between financial institutions and insurance companies.67  This pattern of 
investors is possible because of the highly liquid nature of the U.S. bond market.  
In a liquid market, a bondholder that wants or needs to cash out a municipal bond 
can readily find a buyer, absent extraordinary circumstances.  And this diversity of 
investors, many of which have long-term investment horizons, means that U.S. 
municipalities are not dependent on bank lending.  This is becoming a more obvious 
advantage, since banks world-wide are increasingly being regulated to limit 
liquidity risk.  Long-term municipal bonds are not a natural asset for commercial 
banks holding demand or short-term deposits.   
 
In principle, long-term municipal bonds can be attractive to private and public 
financial institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, investment fund 
managers, sovereign wealth funds, and individual investors. An advantage of 
bonds, from the perspective of investors, is that investment is scalable.  A 
household with some savings can buy a bond or two, a wealthy individual can 
accumulate a diverse portfolio of municipal bonds, and institutional investors can 
buy as many as they need.  Long term municipal bonds are an especially good fit 
for U.S. investors, where banks hold relatively few municipal bonds. In South 
Africa and India, local government borrowers have not issued many long-term 
bonds, partly because of demand side limitations, and partly because there are 
relatively few institutional investors seeking long term municipal debt instruments. 
The longest bond maturities in both countries are 15 years, and 10 years or less is 
common.  In the U.S., 30 year maturities are common, and low interest rates in 
recent years have led to several municipal bond issues with 50-year and even 100-




In India, the total municipal bond market is only about US $200 million,68 out 
of an estimated $1.7 trillion national debt securities market.  This extremely small 
municipal share is dwarfed by the market share of state debt securities, which is 
 
66 Cestau, Dario. "Competition and Market Concentration in the Municipal Bond 
Market." Available at SSRN 3497599 (2019). 
67 SIFMA, Quarterly Breakdown of Municipal Outstanding by Bond Holder Type, retrieved 
December 15, 2019 at https://www.sifma.org/resources/research/us-municipal-securities-holders/ 
68 As of May 2019, per https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/bonds/global-funds-want-
more-disclosure-before-buying-india-muni-debt/articleshow/69142958.cms 
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more than 2,000 times larger. The share of national government securities in the 
market is double the state figure.69  Indian ULBs’ bond debt comes to only about 
US $0.15 per capita, and state level securities add another US $309 per capita, 
which means that subnational borrowing accounts for about 15% of Indian per 
capita GDP.  State debt securities are the significant subnational phenomenon in 
India, not municipal bonds. Since, ultimately, municipal and state debt rely 
primarily on overlapping underlying economic bases for repayment, there will be a 
limit as to how much the municipal bond market for any given state’s ULBs could 
be sustainably expanded without a concomitant reduction in the state’s own long-
term debt. 
 
Municipal bonds in India are listed on the national securities exchange. 
Accordingly, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has issued 
regulations that relate to the listing and trading of municipal bonds.70  A World 
Bank study has concluded that “SEBI rules regarding the listing of municipal bonds 
and public disclosure requirements are derived mainly from the corporate sector 
and are inappropriate in some respects for municipal instruments.”71  These 
regulations provide, inter alia, that issuers of listed municipal bonds must meet 
specified criteria including surplus income in one of the three previous years, and 
the absence of loan or bond defaults for at least the previous year.72  These are not 
very demanding requirements.  Investors and lenders, especially those in the private 
sector, can be more demanding.  Cautious investors are a good thing: encouraging 
investors’ due diligence helps prevent unsustainable municipal debt.  Recently, 
SEBI has promulgated additional requirements for continuing disclosure of 
financial information, credit ratings, escrow accounts, interest accounts, sinking 
fund accounts, and other matters.73  The need to comply with SEBI regulations with 
respect to listed bonds, even though the requirements are not especially onerous, 
adds procedural complexity, and this tends to push ULBs towards loans from banks 
and state sponsored intermediaries, in preference to municipal bonds.  
 
 
69 Dr. Viral V. Acharya, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - June 29, 2019, 
https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1079 
70 Note that in both South Africa and India, municipal bonds are listed on securities exchanges, 
and must meet the listing requirements of regulators.  In the US, almost all municipal bonds are 
traded “over the counter.”  
71 World Bank. 2011. Developing a regulatory framework for municipal borrowing in India: Main 
report (English). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 30 
72 Securities and Exchange Board of India, Issue and Listing of Municipal Debt Securities 
Regulations, 2015 as amended, with effect from 27 September 2019 
73 SEBI Circular No. SEBI/HI/DDHS/CIR/P/134/2019, dated November 13, 2019. 
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The banking sector has been the biggest buyer of municipal bonds.  The 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is responsible for banking supervision.  Of the three 
countries discussed in this article, India’s banking sector is probably the most 
challenged by non-performing assets.74  State and nationally owned banks 
predominate.75 As with most central banks, the RBI is increasingly pursuing a risk-
based approach to banking supervision, consistent with Basel Principles, which 
support market discipline for commercial banks.  An implication of these principles 
is that commercial banks, as deposit-taking institutions, will generally not be able 
to invest a significant portion of their assets in long-term instruments, such as 
municipal bonds.  They may be able to handle 5 to 7-year tenors, but not 20 to 30-
year maturities.  Obviously, ULBs can afford less total debt if their bonds and other 
borrowings must be repaid more quickly. 
 
Insurance companies and pension funds must treat municipal bonds 
differently to government bonds.  Both life insurers and pension funds have 
actuarially calculated long term obligations, and could, in principle, match these 
with long-term investments that are reasonably safe municipal bonds that yield a 
predictable, long-term return.  India’s Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) regulates the investment of insurance funds and classifies 
municipal bonds as “non-governmental securities” that need to be rated at least A+ 
to be eligible for inclusion in an insurance company’s investment portfolio.76   
Similarly, the Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority has classified 
municipal bonds as Asset Class C instruments (fixed income instruments other than 
Government Securities), rather than Asset Class G instruments (central and state 
government securities).77  Class C instruments require a minimum AA rating from 
at least two rating agencies.78  Thus, for these two important classes of potential 
municipal bond investors, municipal obligations are categorically disadvantaged.  
 
74 Gross non-performing loans of banks stood at 9.1 per cent in September 2019, a decline after 
seven consecutive years of increase https://www.indiatoday.in/business/story/gross-npa-ratio-rbi-
1631211-2019-12-24, retrieved 25 January 2020. 
75 An interesting example is the Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO), 
owned by the Government of India, and incorporated in 1970 to directly provide finance for 
construction and urban development, and also to invest in bonds to be issued by State Housing and 
Urban Development Boards, Development Authorities, and others.  The Indian financial sector has 
historically been the most centrally planned, and arguably the least efficient, of the three countries. 
76 World Bank. 2011, at p. 39 
77 Id. 
78 PFRDA Circular re Investment Guidelines for NPS Schemes other than Govt. Sector (CG & 
SG), recovered 14 December 2019 at 
https://www.pfrda.org.in/writereaddata/links/xyz123305fe622-0679-4127-a47a-483063aa70e2.pdf 
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2. South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the municipal bond market is about US $1.3 billion,79 out of a 
total debt securities market of approximately US $234 billion.80 It is worth noting 
that the municipal bond market has steadily been losing ground to direct lending, 
with long-term loans to municipalities now at around US $3.62 billion.  South 
African municipal bond debt stands at about US $22 per capita, but note that this 
is complemented by about US $62 in loan debt. Even the combined municipal loan 
and bond debt is only about 1.3% of South African per capita GDP. This level of 
long-term subnational debt,81 in relation to per capita GDP, is less than one tenth 
of the Indian and levels.  From this perspective, there is significant room for 
sustainable expansion in the South African municipal bond and debt market. 
 
As in India, South African municipal bonds are listed on the securities 
exchange.  Municipal bonds were listed on the Bond Exchange of South Africa 
(BESA) until 2009, when BESA was merged with the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). Sovereign bonds, State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) bonds, corporate 
bonds, and municipal bonds are now all listed on the JSE.  All listed bonds must 
comply with JSE’s Debt Listings Requirements.82  These requirements are 
generally the same for municipal bonds as for other bonds, with some exceptions 
that take into account the timing for municipal financial statements preparation and 
auditing.  The JSE has recently added new requirements for disclosure of influential 
persons and procurement practices.83  While the Debt Listing Requirements require 
financial disclosure, there is no JSE requirement for municipal issuers to have 
surplus income, as there is in India.  Although municipal bonds are listed on the 
JSE, trading is done bilaterally – after the parties reach an agreement, deals are 
reported to the JSE for matching and settlement.84 
 
In addition to JSE listing requirements, national legislation requires 
disclosure.  There are two separate requirements, and failure to comply can have 
serious consequences for the individuals involved.  First, before any debt is 
 
79 South African National Treasury, Municipal Borrowing Bulletin, Issue 14, September 2019 
80https://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/9632/07Statistical
%20tables%20–%20Capital%20Market.pdf 
81 Long term provincial debt in South Africa is negligible. 
82 Available at https://www.jse.co.za/current-companies/issuer-regulation 
83 Amendments to the JSE Debt Listings Requirements Part 2 of 2018, 30 April 2019 
84 South African National Treasury, 2018 Financial Markets Review, page 26 
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incurred, the municipality must make public an information statement setting out 
the particulars of the proposed debt and any security to be provided, and must have 
invited the public and the provincial and national treasuries to comment.85  Second, 
“[a]ny person involved in the borrowing of money by a municipality must, when 
interacting with a prospective lender or when preparing documentation for 
consideration by a prospective investor (a) disclose all information in that person’s 
possession or within that person’s knowledge that may be material to the decision 
of that prospective lender or investor; and (b) take reasonable care to ensure the 
accuracy of any information disclosed.”86  These requirements are intended to 
prevent any misrepresentation, and if failure to comply is deliberate or grossly 
negligent, violation is a criminal offense.87 
 
Pension funds and mutual funds are restricted as to municipal bond 
investments. Under Regulation 28,88 pursuant to the Pension Funds Act, a pension 
fund may only invest in specified assets within defined issuer and aggregate limits. 
With regard to debt securities, the aggregate limit for (on-balance sheet) bank-
issued, corporate and public entity debt combined is 75 %, with a sub-limit of 50% 
for debt of listed companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and a per entity 
limit of 10%.  The term “public entity” here refers to entities subject to the Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA).  This includes national and provincial entities, 
but not municipalities, which are subject to the Municipal Finance Management 
Act (MFMA).  Because there is no specific category for municipalities, municipal 
bonds come under the category “other debt instruments” and must be treated like 
unlisted corporate debt, with a portfolio limit of 5% per entity and 25% overall. 
This difference makes it difficult for municipal bonds to compete in a pension fund 
portfolio, even in an era when many SOEs are in serious financial difficulty.  
Similarly, under FSB Board Notice 90, pursuant to the Collective Investment 
Schemes Control Act,89 there is a separate category for municipalities, but 
aggregate limit is 20% for all municipal bonds, as compared to 100% for bonds 
issued by entities subject to the PFMA.  This means that a mutual fund (“unit trust” 
in South African usage) could be invested 100% in SOE bonds but only 20% in 
municipal bonds.  These regulatory restrictions are not based on risk or 
 
85 MFMA Section 46 
86 MFMA Section 49 
87 MFMA Section 173 
88 Pension Funds Act, 1956: Amendment of Regulation 28 of Regulations Made Under Section 36,  
per Government Gazette, 4 March 2011  
89 https://www.fsca.co.za/Notices/Board%20Notice%2090%20of%202014.pdf, retrieved 25 Jan 
2020 
117
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol4/iss1/15
performance, and unnecessarily limit the potential market for municipal bonds.  In 
contrast to the categorical approach used for pensions and mutual funds, insurers 
base their asset allocation decisions on risk-based financial soundness90 under a 
new Solvency Assessment and Management framework.  This approach avoids 
both errors of including risky investments, and of excluding sound investments. 
 
3. United States 
 
In the U.S., state and local government debt accounts for just over US $3 
trillion, or 4% of the total domestic market for debt instruments and loans, which 
is about $75 trillion.91  This combined state and local debt comes to some $9,177 
per capita, or 15% of US per capita GDP, which represents a long-term 
commitment to infrastructure investment at the subnational level that is comparable 
on an GDP-adjusted per capita basis to India, and more than 10 times the level in 
South Africa. 
 
Municipal bonds are not listed on an exchange, and issuers are not federally 
regulated.  U.S. municipal bonds are traded “over the counter” and thus are not 
subject to listing requirements. Brokers, dealers, and municipal financial advisors 
are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB). National authority to regulate municipal 
bond issuers is limited by principles of federalism (because local governments are 
creatures of the states, the federal government cannot in general regulate their 
actions). However, in 1975 the U.S. Congress used its authority under the 
commerce clause of the Constitution to require municipal securities dealers to 
register with the SEC.92  Registered dealers are regulated by the MSRB,93 a “self-
regulatory organization” (SRO), which sets rules for dealers, subject to oversight 
by the SEC.94  These rules require that underwriters in the primary market prepare 
and file official statements, which are intended to prevent fraud and ensure 
transparency.  They require dealers to disclose to their customers all material facts 
 
90 Chapter 6, Insurance Act 18 of 2017, as implemented 1 July 2018 
91 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), All sectors; debt securities and loans; 
liability, Level [TCMDO], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TCMDO, January 23, 2020. 
92 Section 15B(a)(1)(A), 1934 Securities Exchange Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj 
93 15B(b)(2)(A), ibid. 
94 in a 2018 report, the MSRB outlined the history of its role, and the advantages of the SRO 
model.  The report can be accessed at http://www.msrb.org/~/media/Files/Resources/MSRB-Self-
Regulation-and-the-Municipal-Securities-Market.ashx 
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which the dealer knows or which are reasonably accessible in the market.95  Starting 
in 1995, a requirement was added to for issuers to disclose updated information 
throughout the term a municipal bond is outstanding.96  In 2010, after the global 
financial crisis, Congress added a requirement that municipal financial advisors 
must also register with the SEC and be regulated by the MSRB.  Financial advisors 
are under a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their municipal clients.  Thus, 
bond dealers and financial advisors, rather than municipalities directly, are 
regulated.  
 
Federal tax exemption plays a significant role in the U.S. municipal bond 
market. Interest on municipal bonds is generally excluded from federal taxation 
under the Internal Revenue Code.  Originally, this exclusion was rooted in 
constitutional concerns, and an early Supreme Court case contained dicta to the 
effect that it would be unconstitutional to tax interest on state and local debt 
obligations.97  However, by 1982, many municipalities had used their ability to 
issue tax exempt debt to benefit private development, and public opinion had turned 
against such practices. As one author noted, “K-Mart financed nearly 100 stores 
between 1975 and 1980 with $220.5 million of tax-exempt small issues, while 
McDonald's used small issues to open thirty-two new restaurants in 1979 in 
Pennsylvania and Ohio alone.”98  In response to these perceived abuses, Congress 
passed laws limiting the tax exemption for interest on municipal securities.  The 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)99 required issuers to 
register their bonds and eliminated tax exemption for “small issues” which had been 
used to finance a variety of small, private, businesses; the 1984 Deficit Reduction 
Act (DEFRA)100 imposed an annual state-wide cap on tax-exempt private activity 
issues; and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 restricted tax exemption for arbitrage 
 
95 MSRB Rule G-17 requires dealers and municipal advisors to “deal fairly with all persons;” in 
November 2019, the MSRB received SEC approval to amend and restate its Interpretive Notice 
regarding the fair dealing obligations that underwriters owe to issuers under Rule G-17.  See 
http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-
Rules/General/~/media/CED78C17C33843EC8447405456771663.ashx? 
96 Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 
97 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 (1895); because the Court struck down the 
challenged Act on other grounds, this was dicta, but its caution was respected for nearly a century. 
98 Bedtime for [Industrial Development] Bonds: Municipal Bond Tax Legislation of the First 
Reagan Administration, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs. 213 (1985) 
99 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 
100 Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 611-648, 98 Stat. 494, 901-41  
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bonds.101  Debate continues, as it has for a century, over the tax exemption for 
municipal bond interest.  Opponents argue that the tax exemption is an inefficient 
and perhaps ineffective way to subsidize state and local infrastructure 
investment.102  Proponents argue that “if the tax exemption is eliminated or reduced, 
states and localities will pay more to finance projects, leading to fewer projects and 
fewer jobs, or project costs will be transferred to local tax and rate payers.”103 
 
Pension funds, insurers, and mutual funds actively invest in municipal bonds.  
Instead of specifying categories and quantities of allowable investments, the U.S. 
uses a prudent person standard.  Under Federal law, pension fiduciaries are required 
to invest “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would use….”104 This permits investment in municipal bonds, and such 
investments are common.  U.S. insurers are mostly regulated at the state level, using 
risk-based capital models, which also allow balanced investments in municipal 
bonds. Property, casualty and life insurers all invest in municipal bonds.105  U.S. 
mutual funds invest extensively in municipal bonds, and some invest exclusively 
in municipal bonds, selected on the basis of market timing, geography, quality, or 
duration.106 
 
STATUS AND PROSPECTS 
 
1. India  
 
India’s weak ULBs are unlikely to develop substantial demand.  The lack of 
demand for long term credit is logical given that most ULBs have limited powers 
and functions, as well as limited and unpredictable revenues.  ULBs have only such 
powers as are delegated to them by the law in each state, and it is up to each state 
to decide whether and how state revenues are shared with, and/or local revenue 
 
101 Pub. L. 99-514, § 1301(a) 
102 https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF520.pdf 
103 https://gfoa.org/help-gfoa-preserve-muni-bond-tax-exemption 
104 29 U.S. Code § 1104 (a) (1) (B) 
105 “Municipal Bonds,” National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Center for Insurance 
Policy and Research, retrieved January 30, 2020 at 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_municipal_bonds.htm 
106 For an evaluation of the performance of a variety of municipal bond mutual funds, see Gurwitz, 
J.A. and Smith, D.M., 2019. Municipal Bond Mutual Fund Performance and Active Share 
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instruments authorized to, ULBs in its jurisdiction.107 While there is state to state 
variation, no Indian state has given ULBs a large degree of autonomy, especially in 
comparison to municipalities in South Africa and the US. Residents of Indian cities 
seem to have little expectation or confidence that their local government will 
provide modern infrastructure or reliable services.       
 
There have arguably been forty-one “municipal” bond issues since the 
Bangalore Municipal Corporation issued the first municipal bond, with a state 
guarantee, in 1997.108  This number counted as “municipal” bonds includes seven 
non-ULB issuers, such as the Tamil Nadu State Government, the Tamil Nadu 
Urban Development Fund, the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development 
Authority, and several water and sewerage boards. Besides issuing bonds, ULBs 
and other entities responsible for urban infrastructure also take loans from public 
and private sector financial institutions, including state level funds and 
intermediaries.  
 
The size and tenor of municipal bond issues have been limited. In 1998, 
Ahmedabad, a city of 5.6 million people, was the first municipal corporation in 
India to issue municipal bonds without a government guarantee, in 1998, when it 
borrowed a billion rupees.109  As of 2019, Ahmedabad has issued its fifth municipal 
bond, in the amount of 2 billion rupees.110 The longest maturity for any municipal 
bond in India appears to be 15 years, though 10 years or less is most common. From 
2017, Indian municipal bond issuance is again showing signs of life, after a hiatus 
of several years. Recent bond issues seem to have been stimulated by a 2% interest 
subsidy from the union government, but the amounts remain small and ULB interest 
in municipal bonds appears weak.   
 
There are many factors contributing to weak ULB demand.  Among these are 
1) that commercial and subsidized loans (including loans from state-level 
intermediaries)111 are often available to ULBs at equivalent or better interest rates, 
and with less effort than it takes to issue a municipal bond; and 2) that central and 
 
107 Indian Constitution, Seventy Fourth Amendment Act, 1992 
108 Mathangi Chandrasekhar, of the Janaagraha Centre for Citizenship and Democracy, has 
counted 41 “municipal” issues, through October 2019. Of these, 26 were issued by ULBs, and the 
remainder by a variety of states, state agencies, urban development funds, and water boards. 
109 At the time, this was equivalent to about US $25 million.  For a discussion of this bond issue, 
see C. Vaidya and B. Johnson, Ahmedabad Municipal Bond: Lessons and Pointers, Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 30 (Jul. 28 - Aug. 3, 2001), pp. 2884-2891 
110 This was equivalent to about US $28 million on the date of issue. 
111 We have not been able to locate aggregated figures on non-bond municipal borrowing in India. 
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state government transfer schemes have crowded out the demand for municipal 
bonds.112  Recognizing the need to invest more in urban development, to lay a 
foundation for continued economic growth, a variety of national and state schemes 
have provided infrastructure grants to ULBs, especially since the $20 billion 
JNNURM scheme was launched in 2005.  By providing generous grants for local 
infrastructure, these well-intentioned schemes have weakened the incentive for 
ULBs to issue bonds.  
 
State governments’ interest in strong ULBs is doubtful. While any state could 
legally empower strong ULBs, giving them substantial functions and finances, 
there are few incentives for state legislatures to do so, and no states have gone very 
far in this direction.  Some observers have described an anti-urban bias.113 In most 
states, a minority of legislators represent constituencies that are officially 
“urban.”114 State legislatures therefore have little incentive to put significant 
powers and financial resources in the hands of ULBs, given that they represent 
alternative centres of power, whose leadership may come from opposition political 
parties.   
 
Rather than empower strong ULBs, states have created parallel financing 
channels, using state-controlled entities that have planning and investment powers 
within ULB boundaries.115 These include development authorities, industrial 
development and investment corporations, water and sanitation enterprises, and 
urban rail and transport authorities, and others.116 These authorities typically 
receive financial support from the state, and many have their own revenue 
 
112 These began in 2005 with the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) 
and continued with 2011’s JNNURM II, and 2015’s Smart Cities Mission (SCM) and Atal 
Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT). 
113 Isher Judge Ahluwalia (2019) Urban governance in India, Journal of Urban Affairs, 41:1, 83-
102, DOI: 10.1080/07352166.2016.1271614 
114 Even though many administratively “rural” constituencies have significant urban 
characteristics, so-called “census towns” come under the 73rd Amendment, rather than the 74th. 
115 Gandhi and Pethe cite the Bangalore Metropolitan Region, where master plans for the region 
“included those prepared by the Bangalore Development Authority, Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region Development Authority, Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Planning Authority, 
Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority, etc.” The various plans are prepared in 
isolation, and often conflict. Gandhi and Pethe, Emerging Challenges of Metropolitan Governance 
in India, Economic & Political Weekly July 8, 2017 vol. LII no 27. 
116 Similarly, in the United States, many “municipal” bonds are actually issued by counties, school 
districts, transportation authorities, public universities and colleges, housing authorities, road and 
highway authorities, water districts, power districts, and other special purpose districts and 
authorities. 
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instruments.  Indeed, the biggest “municipal bond” to date was not issued by a 
municipality at all, but rather by the Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development 
Authority, to support the development of Amaravati, the State’s new capital.117 
 
The Union Government has few regulatory handles.  Although the Government 
might like to encourage municipal borrowing and municipal bonds, the power of 
ULBs to borrow, to bind successor councils, to set taxes, fees and charges at an 
adequate level to service substantial debt, all depend entirely on State law.  This 
leaves the Union Government with limited ability to either empower or constrain 
the issuance of municipal bonds.  There has been discussion about a tax exemption 
for municipal bond interest, based on the U.S. model, but that has not happened,118 
and it is far from clear that such an exemption would make a real difference.  The 
success of the U.S. model of local infrastructure financing does not lie in the 
municipal bond as an instrument, nor in the tax exemption as a subsidy, but rather 
in the expectations and trust that most citizens repose in their local government, 
and that is very different from the reality in India. The Union Government has 
attempted to encourage/incentivize ULBs to issue municipal bonds through the Atal 
Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), which provided a 
2% interest subsidy for bonds. Unfortunately, both the tax exemption and the 
interest subsidy are based on “cargo cult” imitation of superficial aspects of the 
U.S. municipal bond market, rather than a contextual and historical understanding 
of how the U.S. market developed as it did, and why it currently functions as it 
does.  The U.S. interest rate subsidy is certainly part of the story, but it is not a 
sufficient explanation for the growth of the municipal bond industry.  A final aspect 
of the Union Government’s approach to municipal bonds is that, through SEBI, it 
has promulgated listing requirements for municipal bonds.  This may have had the 
paradoxical effect of raising entry barriers, and encouraging more loans, rather than 
municipal bonds.   
 
2. South Africa  
 
South African municipalities have broad powers and functions with respect to 
local matters, which include land use planning, streets and street lighting, public 




118 Economic Times, May 15, 2017, Interest subsidy of Rs 400 crore clears way for municipal 
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disposal, electrical distribution, and many other matters.119  All municipalities have 
broad discretion over property rates and tariffs for water and electricity, and a 
constitutionally guaranteed equitable share of nationally raised revenues.120   This 
is a good starting point for a municipal bond market, but it has not proven to be 
sufficient. 
 
Only metropolitan municipalities (“metros”) have so far issued bonds, and not 
all of them have done so.  None of the smaller municipalities have issued bonds, 
although many borrow in the form of loans. Metros generally have strong own-
source revenues and in the aggregate, they generate close to 90% of their revenues 
from own-source instruments. Moreover, infrastructure grants from national 
government to metros increased nearly six-fold over the ten-year period from the 
2006 to the 2016.121  While the 8 metros have substantial borrowing capacity, they 
also have limited incentive to borrow, given the substantial capital transfers they 
have been receiving in recent years.  In contrast to Indian ULBs, South Africa’s 
metros, and many of its secondary city municipalities, have the revenues and 
revenue instruments to be creditworthy, if they manage their fiscal affairs with 
prudence and discipline.  However, this potential has been translated into a growth 
in real demand for long term investment capital. 
 
The number of municipal bond issues in India and South Africa are similar, 
as shown on the chart below: 
 
Municipal Bonds issued in India and South Africa: 1998 to 2019 
 India South Africa 
Number of issues 26 to 41122 24 
Smallest bond issue US $2.4 million US $60.1 million 
Largest issue US $185.7 million US $287.8 million 
Note: USD equivalents are calculated as of the date of issue 
 
The pool of potential South African bond issuers is much smaller than in India.  
South Africa has at most 53 potential municipal issuers, whereas India has over 
4,000 ULBs, as well as a wide variety of development authorities, water and 
 
119 The OECD has characterized South Africa as a unitary state with federal tendencies. 
https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/profile-South-Africa.pdf 
120 Constitution of South Africa, Section 214 
121 South African National Treasury, Municipal Borrowing Bulletin, Issue 2, September 2016, 
Figure 8 
122 See footnote 109 
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sewerage boards, and other potential issuers.  Notwithstanding this broad universe 
of potential issuers, the total value of Indian municipal bonds to date is just over 
US $1.2 billion, while the total value of South African municipal bonds issued to 
date is US $2.8 billion.123 Per capita municipal bond issuance in South Africa is 
more than 40 times the Indian level (and all of the South African issuers are actually 
municipalities).  
 
South African municipal borrowing is static in real terms.  Over the last twenty 
years, outstanding long-term municipal borrowing has changed little in real terms, 
even though it has more than tripled in nominal terms.124  As old debt is retired, it 
is replaced with new debt, but there has been no net growth in real terms.  Over the 
same time period, the proportion of municipal debt represented by municipal bonds 
has dropped dramatically.  Twenty years ago, almost all outstanding long term 
municipal debt in South Africa was in the form of bonds.  Today, loans account for 
about 70%.125   
 
In principle, South Africa has strong policies to enable municipal borrowing 
from the private sector, whether in the form of bonds or loans.126  This approach is 
reflected, inter alia, in comprehensive national legislation,127 which regulates the 
preparation and implementation of municipal budgets and financial statements, 
short- and long-term borrowing, accountability for financial decisions, and many 
other matters.  South African municipalities may enter into long-term debt 
obligations only for the purpose of “capital expenditure on property, plant or 
equipment to be used for the purpose of achieving the objects of local government” 
or, under specified conditions, for re-financing existing long-term debt.128   A 
municipal council must authorize the debt obligation after publishing notice and 
inviting public comment, and no provincial or national government approval is 
required. The legislation also includes provisions for provincial interventions in the 
event of financial problems in municipalities.   
 
123 Author’s calculations. Both figures are the aggregate of nominal values, not adjusted for 
inflation, calculated as of the date of each bond issuance. 
124 South African National Treasury, Municipal Borrowing Bulletin, Issue 13, June 2019, Figure 1 
125 South African National Treasury, Municipal Borrowing Bulletin, Issue 14, September 2019, 
Figure 2 
126 See Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing, 2017 Update, accessed 10 February 2020 at 
https://csp.treasury.gov.za/Resource%20_Centre/Conferences/Documents/DFI%20Day/Municipal
%20Borrowing%20Policy%20Framework%20update%2030%20Dec%202017%20(Draft).pdf 
127 Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 (MFMA), effective July 2004 
128 MFMA, Section 46 
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Local government financial management policies are not always respected.  
Despite MFMA requirements for realistic budgeting,129 many municipalities do not 
collect all of the revenues they project in annual budgets, and are chronically short 
of cash.  This leads to substantial unpaid bills from suppliers, including public 
entities that supply bulk water and electricity to municipalities for distribution. 
Despite a clearly stated policy preference for attracting private sector finance, the 
government has allowed significant growth in public sector lending to 
municipalities.  Legislative provisions for provincial intervention in the case of 
financial problems have not always been followed.130   
 
3. United States 
 
The U.S. is characterized by a profound decentralism.  Although the powers and 
functions of municipalities vary by state, there is a profound decentralism that 
underlies American attitudes toward government.  A basic trust in local political 
leaders is basic to the American character, despite formal differences in legal 
regimes.  Some scholars have studied different U.S. states’ approaches based on 
whether they follow “Dillon’s Rule” or “Home Rule” approaches but recent 
scholarship points out that the actual level of local autonomy enjoyed by 
municipalities in different states is not directly related to either Dillon’s Rule or 
Home Rule.131 The autonomy enjoyed by local government in the U.S. suits the 
people - in poll after poll for decades, around 70% of Americans trust their local 
government.132  And it is local government that must bear the burden of investing 
in local infrastructure. 
 
Urbanization, growth and deterioration will drive continued demand for local 
infrastructure. The population of the U.S. continues to grow and is expected to 
reach some 434 million by the end of the century.133  Long term economic growth 
 
129 MFMA, Section 18 
130 Tracy Ledger and Mahlatse Rampedi, Mind the Gap: Section 139 Interventions in Theory and 
in Practise, Public Affairs Research Institute, 2019 
131 Jesse J. Richardson, Dillon’s Rule is From Mars, Home Rule is From Venus: Local 
Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction, Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, Volume 41, Issue 4, October 2011, Pages 662–685, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjr030 
132 Justin McCarthy, Americans Still More Trusting of Local Than State Government, Gallup 2018  
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is likely to continue.  The U.S. is 82 percent urbanized,134 and most urban 
infrastructure is aging, and badly in need of updating, rehabilitation and 
replacement.  The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) publishes an 
“infrastructure report card” every four years.  For the last two editions, 2013 and 
2017, U.S. infrastructure has gotten a grade of D+.135   The 2017 report estimated 
that the U.S. needs to spend some $4.5 trillion by 2025 to improve the its roads, 
bridges, dams, airports, schools, and other infrastructure.  No doubt actual 
investment will fall short of these targets, but the demand is there, and the 
overwhelming majority of the investment that is made will be funded by local 
government, using municipal bonds. 
 
Demand for infrastructure investment will drive the growth of the bond 
market.  The decentralized system of local infrastructure investment in the U.S. is 
deeply embedded.  It is based in the localism of citizens’ expectations, in the habits 
of municipal officials, in the vested interests of underwriters, bond dealers, rating 
agencies, fund managers, and other capital market institutions. From 1812 until the 
present day, the U.S. municipal bond market has grown steadily.  Episodic market 
regulation has come in reaction to problems and abuses, but has never threatened 
the core business model of financing local infrastructure through the issuance of 
municipal bonds. One lesson to take from this may be that a regulatory framework 
alone cannot drive market development. The impetus to use borrowing to build 
infrastructure originates not in the regulations, but in the aspirations of citizens and 
civic leaders to build their cities.  Borrowing is a means to infrastructure 
investment, and such investment is seen as the key to building great cities.  The 
dreams of urban residents and businesses demand investment, and local political 
systems have evolved to meet those demands.  
 
CONJECTURES 
Context is critical.  Municipal bonds have been successful as a means of financing 
urban infrastructure in the U.S., and continue to finance two-thirds of urban 
infrastructure investment.  It is natural that other countries have sought to emulate 
this model. And, it would be a mistake to extract a specific tool from its context, 
and expect it to work in the same way in a very different context. U.S. municipal 
 
134 World Bank, based on United Nations Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: 
2018 Revision. Retrieved 9 February 2020 at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS 
135 2017 Infrastructure Report Card, American Society of Civil Engineers, retrieved February 9, 
2020 at https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org 
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bonds work as they do because of historical, institutional, legislative and political 
factors that are different from those in India or South Africa.  The investors are 
different, and the borrowers are different. The challenge in seeking to learn from 
the U.S. experience is to discern which contextual factors are most relevant, and 
what differences may be most limiting.  
 
Bonds and loans both deserve attention. In all three countries, arguments for the 
wise use of local borrowing to finance urban infrastructure are well-known: 
residents and businesses can benefit from economic and social infrastructure today, 
and cities can spread the capital cost over many years and include future users as 
part of the financing plan.  Cities can repay their borrowing in part from the 
economic returns on infrastructure and social investments being financed.  
Borrowing from the private sector allows local government to leverage current 
resources, and to invest in more infrastructure, more quickly, than could be done 
otherwise.  These advantages are not unique to municipal bonds. Loans can achieve 
the same benefits, if they are long-term and tap into private sector sources of capital.  
Both bonds and loans can be tailored to meet specific needs.136  Although municipal 
bonds are of perennial interest in both India and South Africa, it is not obvious that 
they are preferable to loans, especially from municipal borrowers’ perspectives. 
Loans tend to have fewer transaction costs, and can be more easily crafted to meet 
the specific needs of borrowers and institutional lenders.  Whether at the local and 
practical level, or at the state or national policy level, a conversation about financing 
local infrastructure should not be limited to municipal bonds.   
 
Building a market requires a long-term perspective. One advantage of bonds is 
liquidity, and liquidity requires a market.  The U.S. has an active municipal bond 
market, with a significant volume of daily trades.  This arguably leads to the 
allocative efficiency and price discovery we associate with capital markets 
generally. The evolution of an active bond market takes time, and it takes volume.  
Although a number of municipal bonds have been brought to market in both India 
and South Africa, the volume of outstanding bonds in both countries is quite small, 
and insufficient to support a liquid market. Notably, this is in contrast to the market 
for sovereign bonds in both countries.  While individual municipalities looking to 
borrow are naturally interested in the best deal they can find at the time they want 
to borrow, national level policy-makers may have a longer-term perspective, and 
may see an advantage in encouraging the development of a municipal bond market 
for a variety of reasons.  Doing so requires a systemic approach, patience and 
flexibility.  Supporting individual bond issues is unlikely to lead to a market.  The 
 
136 Some kinds of public private partnerships can also finance public infrastructure in much the 
same way as a bond or a loan. 
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emerging municipal bond markets in India and South Africa are each tiny in 
comparison the U.S. market, but we must remember that the U.S. market has a 200-
year head-start. The U.S. municipal bond market sits at the intersection of two 
systems: a system of capital markets that has evolved since the birth of the nation, 
and an approach to infrastructure finance that involves deep-seated faith in 
localism, and a general trust in local institutions. 
 
Investors and bondholders – the supply side of capital. India and South Africa 
are blessed and cursed with public sector financial institutions that invest in 
municipal debt instruments, including loans and bonds.  In hard times, these public 
lenders can invest in municipal debt that might not be attractive to the private sector.  
But these institutions, and their instinct for self-preservation, can crowd out private 
sector efforts to finance local infrastructure. In both India and South Africa, 
institutional investors’ (mutual fund/unit trust, insurance, pension funds) interest in 
municipal bonds is limited to some degree by government regulations that treat 
municipal bonds unfavourably in comparison to sovereign instruments. Households 
and individuals in India and South Africa do not have ready access to municipal 
bonds as investments, and are not familiar with them.  In South Africa, few 
individuals with significant resources are prepared to invest in municipal bonds – 
the reputation of all spheres of government has suffered as many state owned 
enterprises have been mismanaged and some have become insolvent.  In India, 
wealthy individuals seem to have less faith in financial instruments than in hard 
assets such as real estate and precious metals.  By contrast, in the U.S., middle class 
and wealthy individuals have a long-standing willingness to invest in municipal 
bonds.  For generations, municipal bonds been seen as relatively safe and sensible 
long-term investment instruments, well-suited to saving for children’s college 
education or retirement.  To build such individual and household interest in India 
or South Africa would take a confluence of substantive and marketing efforts, but 
could eventually mobilize substantial additional capital for the public good. 
 
Local governance and sustainable borrowing – the demand side.  When local 
government borrows, it borrows on behalf of its people.  They must ultimately pay 
the debt.  The demand for infrastructure and the sustainability of borrowing depends 
on a fundamentally sound social contract between local government and the people. 
Weaknesses in local governance in India and South Africa limit the demand side of 
the market.  In the case of India, ULBs are legally, institutionally and financially 
weak, and few people have confidence in their local government institutions.  South 
African municipalities have more power and more reliably revenues, but they also 
lack the confidence of their citizens.  To the extent active citizen participation is 
evident in either India or South Africa, it often involves wealthy and/or politically 
connected individuals and groups who bend local government to their own 
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purposes. Local government borrowing without the confidence of the people can 
eventually backfire. 
 
Indians have limited involvement with local government.  Politically active 
Indian citizens seem more occupied with national, state, and ethnic issues than with 
local urban development.  One author tells us that “while voters may reward or 
punish incumbents for their public service delivery, they vote for other reasons as 
well (e.g., caste, religion, patronage benefits, party leader’s charisma), and in any 
case, a vote could at best express a desire for improved services generally, not for 
some particular service….”137  Local issues such as inclusive growth and spatial 
development, and what those things demand in terms of infrastructure investment, 
do not attract much attention in the press or in social media. This may be because 
ULBs have little power, or it may be that citizens do not think they can have much 
impact. Expectations of ULBs are low, urban service delivery and infrastructure are 
sub-optimal, and this low-level equilibrium will be difficult to shift.138  
 
South Africans have little faith in local government.  While the legal framework 
provides many mechanisms for citizen participation, these are not used or trusted 
by the masses.  In one survey, citizens were asked how much they trust their elected 
local government council.  More than 40% responded “not at all,” and another 24% 
said “just a little.”  Only 14% said they trusted their council “a lot.”139 One South 
African scholar has written “that for as long as participatory local governance 
mechanisms are inefficient, and disconnected from the needs, goals, and capacity 
of local citizens, the various tensions and conflict between citizens and local 
municipalities in South Africa will continue unabated.”140 The lack of faith in local 
 
137 Blair, H. (2018) ‘Citizen Participation and Political Accountability for Public Service Delivery 
in India: Remapping the World Bank’s Routes’, Journal of South Asian Development, 13(1), pp. 
54–81. doi: 10.1177/0973174118760942. 
138 Delhi may be the one city where local issues drive politics, because of the National Capital 
Territory’s unique constitutional status.  In Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi vs. 
Union of India, CA No. 2357 of 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that Delhi’s government has 
substantial legislative and executive powers, more or less on the level of a state government.  As 
one commentator has written, “the Court chose to prioritise the interpretation that would give 
citizens the biggest say in shaping the policies that govern them at the most immediate level,” 
Preetika Mathur, NCT Delhi v. Union of India: The Role of the Westminster Style Cabinet System 
of Government in the Indian Federal Scheme, Indian Journal of Constitutional & Administrative 
Law, August 7, 2018 
139 Afrobarometer (R7 2016/2018), retrieved 8 February 2020 at http://afrobarometer.org/online-
data-analysis/analyse-online 
140 Matebesi, Sethulego. "Evolution of Local Governance in South Africa: The Triumph or Failure 
of Participatory Governance?" In Civil Strife against Local Governance: Dynamics of Community 
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government leads frustrated citizens to dramatic and sometimes violent street 
protests, which are often covered by media in a way that de-legitimizes the 
underlying concerns.141  
 
Most Americans have a general trust in local government.  A 2018 Gallup 
report found that 72% of U.S. adults have a "great deal" or a "fair amount" of trust 
in their local government.142 This is not unanimous or unquestioning trust, but it is 
a higher level of trust than state or national government enjoy. “Citizens are willing 
and able to trust city councils and their own voice to come to rational borrowing 
and investment decisions, and are willing to put the volunteer time into committees 
and processes that develop land use policies, capital improvement priorities, and 
budget plans for local government.”143  The American success with municipal 
bonds probably has much to do with the autonomy and accountability of 
municipalities. In genuine and sometimes contentious dialogue with citizens, 
councillors determine the services to provide, and they set taxes and fees sufficient 
to pay for those services.  These habits are rooted in the historical resourcefulness 
of U.S. cities. Cities borrowed, beginning 200 years ago, because they had to 
borrow – no one else was going to pay for local infrastructure. State governments 
were weak and sometimes far away.  The national government was also weak, and 
still further away.  Neither was or is trusted as much as local government.  Habits 
of local self-reliance developed, which continue to guide the way people think 
about local government finances and infrastructure investment.  
 
Municipal bonds are simple, markets are complex. As Indian and South African 
municipalities have experienced, it is not difficult to issue a municipal bond of 
modest size with a 10 to 15-year maturity.  But in both countries, a direct loan is 
more common, and that is not likely to change unless the capital markets offer better 
deals.  From a national policy perspective, a municipal bond market might seem to 
offer advantages in terms of efficiency and financial discipline, but can be a real 
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challenge to influence all of the inputs that ultimately determine the growth or 
shrinkage of the bond market.  South Africa’s bond market has been shrinking 
steadily in real terms, even as municipal borrowing for infrastructure has remained 
steady.  India’s municipal bond market is much smaller, even though the country is 
much bigger. The bulk of urban infrastructure in India is driven by states and their 
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